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Summary box
 ► The Global Polio Eradication Initiative was estab-
lished in 1988 when polio was endemic in 125 
countries causing some 350 000 clinical cases per 
year. Today, the number of polio cases has been re-
duced by 99.9% and polio remains endemic in only 
three countries—Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly 
Nigeria.
 ► This is a great success of the global community. 
However, after a number of missed deadlines and 
investments of US$20 billion, the eradication goal 
has still not been achieved. The challenges of the 
‘last mile’ of eradication seem insurmountable. They 
comprise political instability and community resis-
tance on one hand.
 ► On the other hand, secondary epidemics abide, 
initially due to wild-type polio virus imported from 
endemic countries and now due to circulating vac-
cine-derived polio viruses. The latter epidemics 
originate from back-mutations of oral polio vaccine 
(OPV) viruses regaining neurovirulence under condi-
tions of low immunisation coverage and weak health 
systems.
 ► Finally, the challenges of the global transition from 
OPV to inactivated polio vaccine, of destroying all 
OPV stocks, of controlling polio spread from long-
term excreters, and of preventing deliberate spread 
of de-novo synthesised polioviruses have to be over-
come. Under all likely scenarios, polio vaccination 
will need to be continued for decades, or indefinitely.
 ► We argue that the global community should cel-
ebrate the massive reduction in polio cases, and 
then shift course from polio eradication to a more 
realistic goal of sustained, systematic control, along 
with increased investments into routine vaccine de-
livery systems within the frame of Universal Health 
Coverage.
InTroduCTIon
Polio is a faecal-orally transmitted, highly 
infectious disease caused by wild-type polio 
virus (WPV) types 1, 2 or 3.1 2 Today, the 
majority of polio outbreaks are caused by 
circulating vaccine-derived polio viruses 
(cVDPV) originating from back-mutations of 
oral polio vaccine (OPV) viruses which have 
recovered the WPV phenotype properties 
of neurovirulence and transmissibility; most 
cVDPV originate from type 2 OPV.3–5 Type 2 
WPV has been eradicated already since 1999 
and type 3 WPV has no longer been detected 
since November 2012.6 Thus, the major chal-
lenges now are posed by remaining WPV type 
1 and by cVDPV.7
Early, buT TrunCaTEd SuCCESS
In 1988—8 years after the successful eradi-
cation of smallpox—the Global Polio Eradi-
cation Initiative (GPEI) was established as a 
public–private partnership with the goal to 
eradicate polio by the year 2000. Back then, 
the annual global number of polio cases was 
around 350 000 and the disease was endemic 
in 125 countries.6 The main interventions of 
the GPEI were to increase OPV coverage—
later replaced by inactivated polio vaccine 
(IPV) in industrialised countries—through 
the routine Expanded Program on Immuniza-
tion (EPI) of the WHO, and mass vaccination 
campaigns.6 Subsequent modelling studies 
indicated that polio eradication, as compared 
with control, would be more cost-effective 
and ultimately incur substantial net bene-
fits.8 9 These studies were, however, criticised 
as depending on untenable or at least highly 
optimistic assumptions.10–12
The initial results of the GPEI were impres-
sive, with a rapid reduction in the numbers 
of global polio cases and endemic countries. 
Eradication, however, was neither achieved by 
the year 2000, nor were new deadlines met 
in the following years.4 6 13 Since 2012, the 
World Health Assembly considered polio a 
‘Programmatic Emergency for Global Public 
Health’,14 15 and in May 2013 it endorsed the 
Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic Plan 
2013–2018 (the ‘Polio Plan’), which calls for 
the eradication of all WPV, all cVDPV and 
all OPV viruses.6 14 The Polio Plan combined 
locally adapted new tactics to strengthen 
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national programme with technological innovations (eg, 
more effective and safer monovalent and bivalent OPV 
formulations) to achieve its main objectives, namely to 
stop all WPV transmission by the year 2014 and to speed 
up the control of cVDPV outbreaks.14
WPV transmission, however, stopped neither in 2014 
(as planned) nor in 2018 (the year planned for certi-
fication). In January 2019, the Chairs of GPEI’s main 
global advisory bodies issued a joint statement ‘urging all 
involved in the effort to excel in their roles’.7 While their 
goal to reach ‘every last child’ with vaccines including 
polio remains highly commendable, the goal of eradi-
cation warrants reconsideration. Unlike smallpox, polio 
lacks ideal characteristics for eradication. Smallpox had 
a very high manifestation rate and a straightforward 
epidemiological case definition, making outbreaks easy 
to identify; and a vaccine with the characteristics of a 
near perfect intervention tool (eg, heat stable; long-term 
immunity, potentially life-long, after one inoculation). 
This made eradication possible within slightly more than 
a decade between the onset of the programme in 1966 
and the last naturally occurring case in 1977—and with a 
rather small budget.
But none of these apply to polio: several doses of 
OPV are needed to convey immunity in low-hygiene 
settings; and the virus may have been spreading for 
some time before clinical cases are diagnosed.16 More-
over, the problem of cVDPV has only been realised in 
the year 2000 when it was first detected on Hispaniola.17 
In addition, suspicions towards polio vaccination among 
Muslim populations in the remaining endemic areas has 
increased since the Afghanistan war started in 2002.1 2 18
CHallEngIng EpIdEmIolgICal dEvElopmEnTS
Since 2000, secondary epidemics—caused by either a 
direct spread of WPV from the remaining endemic coun-
tries to neighbouring countries (although no longer 
in the past 5 years) or by cVDPV—were reported from 
about 30 countries formerly certified as polio-free, most 
recently from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Papua New Guinea, Somalia and Syria.4 13 18 19 A total of 
21 and 12 WPV cases were reported from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, respectively, in 2018; by 26 June 2019, 
the number of new WPV cases reported had reached 
already 37 (10 in Afghanistan, 27 in Pakistan).4 Thus, 
polio remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two 
countries which share a porous border. Nigeria, while not 
certified as polio-free, has so far reported no new WPV 
cases in 2019.4 Regarding cVDPV cases, a total of 104 were 
reported for the whole of 2018 (DRC 20, Indonesia 1, 
Mozambique 1, Niger 10, Nigeria 34, Papua New Guinea 
26, Somalia 12); by 26 June 2019, the total of number of 
new cVDPV stood at 20 (Angola 1, DRC 5, Ethiopia 1, 
Niger 1, Nigeria 9, Somalia 3).4
Important reasons for continuing transmission are first, 
the weak health systems and correspondingly low routine 
childhood immunisation coverage in many countries still 
at risk of polio due to ongoing political instability, under-
development and poverty, compounded by the technical 
challenges of the GPEI; and second, the perception 
that polio eradication is a priority of wealthier ‘Western’ 
countries, not of the people living in the countries 
where elimination proves to be the hardest, as has been 
shown in Pakistan.20 21 While there have been repeated 
OPV campaigns in the remaining endemic countries 
for many years (eg, 6–8 campaigns per year in the crit-
ical provinces of Pakistan and Nigeria), routine health 
services including immunisation services had in the past 
been largely neglected, even disrupted by vertical polio 
campaigns,22 and overall vaccination coverage remains 
low in several countries and regions.23
The current DRC epidemic has emerged in different 
provinces as independent cVDPV type 2 outbreaks, which 
now threatens to spread to other neighbouring coun-
tries and may endanger the whole of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA).3 5 By 2016, 155 countries had already replaced 
trivalent OPV with a bivalent (types 1 and 3) vaccine; the 
DRC outbreak thus demonstrates the weaknesses in polio 
surveillance systems and—if not contained—may cause a 
general move back to the trivalent OPV.3 4 10 24
The GPEI faces further technical challenges which 
incur at least a theoretical risk of future outbreaks. They 
include the decades-long excretion of polio-related 
viruses in persons with a B-cell defect (this risk may only 
be minute as no resulting outbreaks have been identified 
since the switch from trivalent OPV), the risk of ongoing 
circulation of polio viruses in populations with high IPV 
coverage due to low mucosal immunity, the possibility of 
an accidental spread of unknowingly stored polioviruses 
from laboratories, or even a deliberate spread of de-novo 
synthesised polioviruses.6 25 Failure to contain poliovirus 
would be a greater risk than with smallpox virus because 
resulting outbreaks are less easily identified and thus 
contained.
And sadly, even successful eradication of poliovirus 
may not mean an end of polio-like illness. Other viruses 
from the same family (eg, enteroviruses D68, D71) may 
produce flaccid paralysis resembling poliomyelitis, with 
outbreaks reported from a number of industrialised 
countries in recent years.26 27 The existence of other 
causes of disease does not mean that eradication of one 
cause should not be attempted. However, it would bring 
about the challenge of explaining to the world commu-
nity why outbreaks presenting with the clinical symptoms 
of a disease eradicated at substantial cost continue to 
occur.
THE CoSTS of EradICaTIon
The cost of the GPEI amounts to around US$20 billion 
since its initiation. The Polio Plan included total 
direct costs of US$5.5 billion, which were increased to 
US$7 billion until 2019.5 WHO is currently developing a 
new strategic plan for the years 2019–2023, with a budget 
of roughly US$4.2 billion.9 Evidently, a high investment 
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into a successful eradication programme would be cost-ef-
fective, given the long term costs of continuous control 
programmes9; however, this would imply that eradication 
is technically and politically achievable, which appears 
increasingly unlikely.5 20 28 Thirty years after the onset of 
GPEI, it remains unclear for how long the international 
community will be willing to continue funding polio 
eradication efforts. Furthermore, countries in the devel-
oping world may no longer accept the relative neglect 
of other health sector priorities for the sake of a global 
programme that fails to keep its promise.18
The focus on the eradication effort and its repeating 
failures is tragic: it obscures that the control of polio has 
been a historic success of the global health community. 
In this respect, the GPEI has made a positive contribu-
tion. The original GPEI plan included routine immu-
nisation as one of the four pillars of eradication. After 
initial, purely vertical efforts which harmed existing EPIs, 
the polio eradication initiative aimed to strengthen also 
horizontal, routine immunisation programmes, and in 
some cases even to support weak health services.22 29 30 
The EPI brought about major achievements since its initi-
ation in 1974, when immunisation services reached less 
than 5% of children in developing countries.31 By 2014, 
the mean global coverage of children under 1 year of age 
with three doses of DTP vaccine (DTP3) was estimated 
at 85%.32 However, major inequalities remain between 
and even within countries, with DPT3 coverage rates well 
below 50% in numerous second-level administrative units 
of SSA.23 32 Hence, further targeted strengthening of the 
EPI is needed.
from EradICaTIon To ConTrol
In 2019, the world ‘is at a critical point in polio eradi-
cation’.33 This could be the year to implement the 
lessons learnt from GPEI and to move from the eradi-
cation goal to sustained polio control, as had already 
been proposed by leading experts on smallpox eradica-
tion more than 10 years ago.28 It will not be possible to 
simply stop GPEI interventions, as the low EPI coverage 
in a number of developing countries would rapidly lead 
to polio outbreaks, with the risk of re-established polio 
endemicity.
Thus, a broad multidisciplinary discussion of all 
stakeholders and a careful planning is required to 
establish an alternative WHO-led global Polio Control 
Programme (PCP). WHO would define minimum immu-
nisation coverage rates to be achieved in all strata of 
society in all countries as well as intervention measures 
such as targeted mass vaccination campaigns in case of 
outbreaks. The phasing out of OPV in exchange to IPV 
would continue, but monovalent, bivalent and trivalent 
OPV would be stored and employed to fight outbreaks 
of symptomatic or asymptomatic (eg, detected through 
environmental surveillance) polio. A well-designed PCP 
would thus build on the experiences and some elements 
of the GPEI, secure the achievements made, but drop the 
presently unattainable goal of eradication.
The activities of a PCP would be less demanding and 
thus less costly compared with the ongoing massive efforts 
of the already excessively long ‘last mile’ of the GPEI, 
assuming an underlying law of diminishing returns. With 
the shift to PCP, a proportion of GPEI funds could be 
reinvested into strengthening EPI in countries with low 
vaccination coverage (this would build on the GPEI goal 
of transitioning GPEI resources from polio eradication 
activities to sustaining polio essential functions while 
addressing other public health priorities). More broadly, 
as agreed already with the establishment of the sustain-
able development goals, the global health community 
would prioritise establishing Universal Health Coverage 
and committing adequate resources to maintain the 
gains in healthcare staff and services so far funded via 
the GPEI.30
ConCluSIon
In conclusion, there are two strategies that the world 
should not be content with: first, unsystematic and unco-
ordinated polio control efforts, implemented by indi-
vidual countries acting on their own. Second, continued 
polio eradication efforts offering simply more of the 
same. Urging ‘all involved in the effort to excel in their 
roles’ to achieve polio eradication is just such a strategy.7 
It merely pours more money into an ultimately unsustain-
able vertical programme.
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